BETSHY

Author: Betshy

  • How Psychological Factors Shape our Understanding of Metaphysical Concepts

    How Psychological Factors Shape our Understanding of Metaphysical Concepts

    Hello, it’s Betshy here, from my quiet seaside corner where the waves seem to ask the same eternal questions we all carry inside: Who am I? What happens after this life? Is there meaning in the chaos ? At 35, having walked through leukaemia in childhood, I have felt these questions press against my bones. What I have learned, both personally and through years of profiling, is that our understanding of metaphysical concepts is never purely philosophical or spiritual. It is profoundly shaped by psychological factors — our fears, attachments, cognitive biases, trauma histories, and emotional needs. Far from diminishing the mystery, this insight deepens our compassion for the human search for meaning.

    Advertisements

    At the heart of this interplay lies terror management theory (TMT). Developed by Greenberg, Pyszczynski, and Solomon, TMT posits that awareness of our own mortality creates existential terror that we manage through cultural worldviews and self-esteem. Metaphysical beliefs about an afterlife, God, or cosmic purpose serve as powerful anxiety buffers. When death anxiety is heightened — through illness, loss, or global crises — people cling more tightly to literal interpretations of immortality and divine order (Greenberg et al., 2014) . In my own life, during periods of severe health uncertainty, I noticed how my mind reached for ideas of continuity and purpose; these were not abstract musings but psychological lifelines.

    Attachment theory offers another powerful lens. Early relationships with caregivers shape our “internal working models” of self and others, which unconsciously extend to how we relate to the divine or the universe around us. Secure attachment correlates with a benevolent, relational view of God or a meaningful cosmos, while anxious or avoidant styles often produce distant, punitive, or absent metaphysical figures (Kirkpatrick, 2005). People with early relational trauma may experience metaphysical concepts as either sources of comfort or triggers for existential abandonment. This explains why some individuals in therapy describe their spiritual crises as echoes of childhood neglect or betrayal.

    Cognitive biases further sculpt our metaphysical landscape. Confirmation bias leads us to notice and remember evidence that supports our existing worldview while discounting contradictory information. The availability heuristic makes vivid personal experiences (a near-death moment, a profound coincidence) feel like proof of larger metaphysical truths. Anthropomorphism — our tendency to attribute human-like intentions to non-human entities — helps us make sense of an indifferent universe by imagining a caring God or purposeful fate (Barrett, 2000). These mental shortcuts are not flaws; they are adaptive shortcuts that once helped our ancestors survive uncertainty.

    Trauma and dissociation add another layer. Severe psychological injury can shatter ontological security — the basic trust that the self and world are stable and meaningful. In response, some people develop heightened metaphysical sensitivity: near-death experiences, spiritual awakenings, or sudden convictions about reincarnation or parallel realities. Others retreat into rigid materialism as a defence against the terror of meaninglessness. Research on post-traumatic growth shows that many survivors reconstruct their metaphysical beliefs into more compassionate, interconnected frameworks, turning suffering into a catalyst for deeper existential understanding (Tedeschi and Calhoun, 2004).

    Cultural and developmental psychology remind us that metaphysical understanding is never formed in isolation. Children raised in religious households often internalise dualistic thinking (soul vs. body, good vs. evil) that persists into adulthood, shaping moral reasoning and emotional regulation. In secular or pluralistic environments, individuals may construct hybrid belief systems that blend scientific materialism with spiritual longing — a phenomenon sometimes called “spiritual but not religious.” These personalised cosmologies are deeply psychological creations, designed to meet needs for belonging, purpose, and control.

    Emotions, too, colour our metaphysical lens. Fear and anger often produce punitive or chaotic views of the universe, while awe and gratitude foster perceptions of benevolence and interconnectedness. Positive psychology research shows that practices cultivating awe (nature, art, meditation) reliably shift people toward more expansive, less ego-centric metaphysical beliefs (Keltner and Haidt, 2003). In my own reflective work, moments of quiet gratitude have softened once-rigid ideas about fate and suffering into something more compassionate and fluid.

    Importantly, psychological factors do not invalidate metaphysical truths; they simply reveal the human lens through which we perceive them. Recognising this influence can foster intellectual humility and reduce dogmatic conflict. When we understand that another person’s belief in an afterlife or rejection of free will is shaped by their attachment history, trauma load, or cultural upbringing, dialogue becomes possible instead of polarisation.

    In clinical and forensic settings, this awareness is practical. Therapists working with personality disorders or trauma survivors often encounter clients whose metaphysical crises (loss of faith, sudden spiritual awakenings) are entangled with emotional dysregulation. Gentle exploration of the psychological roots — without dismissing the spiritual dimension — can support integration and healing.

    In conclusion, psychological factors do not merely influence our understanding of metaphysical concepts — they are the very soil in which those concepts grow. Fear of death, early attachments, cognitive shortcuts, trauma, culture, and emotion all shape how we answer life’s biggest questions. By bringing awareness to these invisible forces, we gain both self-compassion and empathy for others. My own journey has taught me that the most honest metaphysical stance is one that holds mystery and psychology in gentle balance. Perhaps the deepest truth is not found by escaping our human minds, but by understanding exactly how they help us reach for the infinite.

    References

    Barrett, J. L. (2000) Why would anyone believe in God? AltaMira Press. Available at: https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/why-would-anyone-believe-in-god/9780521816069 (Accessed: 23 March 2026).

    Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T. and Solomon, S. (2014) ‘The psychology of terror management: a review and update’, Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 49, pp. 1–60. Available at: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0065260114000023 (Accessed: 23 March 2026).

    Keltner, D. and Haidt, J. (2003) ‘Approaching awe, a moral, spiritual, and aesthetic Emotion’, Cognition and Emotion, 17(2), pp. 297–314. Available at: https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2003-00001-001 (Accessed: 23 March 2026).

    Kirkpatrick, L. A. (2005) Attachment, evolution, and the psychology of religion. Guilford Press. Available at: https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2005-01942-000 (Accessed: 23 March 2026).

    Tedeschi, R. G. and Calhoun, L. G. (2004) ‘Posttraumatic growth: conceptual foundations and empirical evidence’, Psychological Inquiry, 15(1), pp. 1–18. Available at: https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2004-10834-001 (Accessed: 23 March 2026).

  • Micro Relapse: A Reflection with Insight About Life

    Micro Relapse: A Reflection with Insight About Life

    Here I sit. I am currently having a mental health crisis. But it is temporary. Literally, I approximate a period of six hours until I recalibrate myself. I think of son, my dear prince. I have plans some time this year to gift him my current iMac. I would certainly not like it if he saw me in this state. I wish I was not this reckless with my mental health. I don’t want to destroy all the progress I’ve made so far. But due to struggling with life, I had a micro relapse…

    Advertisements

    Subscribe to get access

    Subscribe
  • Vitamins and Personality Disorder: An Informative Brief

    Vitamins and Personality Disorder: An Informative Brief

    Hello. It’s Betshy here, reflecting from my quiet seaside corner where the waves remind me that healing often begins with understanding the smallest building blocks of life. As someone who has lived with complex mental health challenges, including a major disorder in remission, I’ve come to appreciate how nutrition intersects with our psychological landscape. Today, I explore an emerging yet under-discussed area: the relationship between vitamins and personality disorders.

    Advertisements

    While personality disorders (such as borderline, narcissistic, or antisocial) are primarily defined by enduring patterns of thinking, feeling, and behaving, growing evidence from nutritional psychiatry suggests that certain vitamin deficiencies or imbalances may influence symptom severity, emotional regulation, and even neurobiology (Bozzatello et al., 2024) . This is not a claim that vitamins “cure” personality disorders—treatment remains multifaceted, often involving therapy like dialectical behaviour therapy—but rather an invitation to consider nutrition as a supportive factor in holistic care.

    Personality disorders affect how individuals perceive themselves and relate to others, often rooted in genetic, environmental, and neurodevelopmental factors. Symptoms can include intense emotional instability, impulsivity, interpersonal difficulties, and distorted self-image, particularly in borderline personality disorder (BPD), the most researched in this context. Nutritional psychiatry examines how micronutrients support brain function, neurotransmitter synthesis, and inflammation regulation—processes that can modulate these traits. Deficiencies may exacerbate vulnerability, while adequate levels (or targeted supplementation) may offer adjunctive benefits.

    Vitamin D: The Sunshine Nutrient and Emotional Regulation

    Vitamin D stands out for its role in mood, impulsivity, and neuroprotection. Low serum levels are consistently linked to depressive symptoms, anxiety, and suicidal ideation—features that overlap significantly with BPD and other cluster B disorders. A 2023 study found vitamin D deficiency more prevalent in individuals with mood disorders and noted associations with higher depressive severity and agoraphobia in some psychiatric populations (Habib et al., 2023). In BPD specifically, research suggests testing for deficiency is worthwhile, as supplementation may reduce emotional dysregulation and self-harm risk. Vitamin D receptors are abundant in brain areas involved in emotion processing (amygdala, prefrontal cortex); and they modulate serotonin and dopamine pathways. Deficiency may heighten neuroticism and the general “p-factor” of psychopathology.

    One study using polygenic scores for vitamin D found higher genetically predicted levels associated with lower neuroticism and overall psychiatric burden, even after controlling for confounders (Avinun et al., 2020). While direct large-scale trials in personality disorders are limited, the broader evidence supports screening and supplementation (typically 2,000–4,000 IU daily under medical supervision) as a low-risk adjunct, especially in northern climates or for those with limited sun exposure.

    B Vitamins: Folate, B12, and the One-Carbon Cycle

    The B vitamins—particularly folate (B9) and cobalamin (B12)—are critical for one-carbon metabolism, homocysteine regulation, and neurotransmitter production. Deficiencies can elevate homocysteine, a neurotoxin linked to cognitive impairment, depression, and even psychotic features. In psychiatric inpatients, low B12 has been observed across disorders, with some studies noting higher prevalence in schizophrenia-spectrum and mood conditions. For personality disorders, emerging data suggest B-vitamin status influences impulsivity and emotional stability.

    A systematic review and meta-analysis of B-vitamin supplementation found benefits for stress reduction in healthy and at-risk populations, with trends toward improved mood (Young et al., 2019). Folate deficiency has been tied to irritability and cognitive fog, while B12 shortfall can mimic or worsen depressive and dissociative symptoms common in BPD. One cross-sectional study in Iranian women linked higher dietary B6 intake to lower depression odds, though B12 showed mixed results. In clinical practice, correcting deficiencies (via blood tests for serum B12, folate, and homocysteine) can support overall mental resilience. Supplementation (e.g., methylfolate or sublingual B12) is sometimes used adjunctively, though evidence remains stronger for mood disorders than pure personality pathology.

    Other Nutrients and Broader Considerations

    Omega-3 fatty acids (often discussed alongside vitamins) show promise in reducing anger, impulsivity, and dissociative symptoms in BPD, per reviews of nutraceuticals in psychiatric disorders (Bozzatello et al., 2024) . Zinc and magnesium also warrant mention for their roles in neurotransmitter balance and stress response, with deficiencies potentially amplifying anxiety and emotional lability.

    Importantly, vitamins are not standalone treatments. Personality disorders require evidence-based psychotherapy as the cornerstone. Nutritional interventions work best as adjuncts—addressing deficiencies identified through testing rather than blanket supplementation. Factors like gut health, inflammation, and lifestyle (diet quality, sunlight, exercise) mediate effects. Genetic variations (e.g., MTHFR polymorphisms affecting folate metabolism) may influence individual responses.

    Limitations in current research are clear: most studies focus on mood or anxiety rather than personality disorders specifically, sample sizes are small, and causation is hard to establish. Confounders like poor diet in severe mental illness or medication side effects complicate findings. Nonetheless, nutritional psychiatry is gaining traction, with calls for routine screening in psychiatric care (Firth et al., 2019).

    In my own life and work on betshy.com, I’ve seen how addressing basic nutritional needs can support emotional stability amid life’s storms. For those with personality disorders, a thoughtful discussion with a clinician about vitamin status—especially D, B12, and folate—may open a gentle, supportive avenue for wellbeing. Small, evidence-informed steps can complement deeper therapeutic work, fostering greater self-compassion and resilience.

    As research evolves, integrating nutrition into personality disorder care holds promise—not as a cure, but as a compassionate ally in the journey toward stability and growth.

    References

    Avinun, R. et al. (2020) ‘Vitamin D polygenic score is associated with neuroticism and the general psychopathology factor’, Personality and Individual Differences, 164, 110052. Available at: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7107583/ (Accessed: 20 March 2026).

    Bozzatello, P. et al. (2024) ‘Nutraceuticals in psychiatric disorders: a systematic review’, International Journal of Molecular Sciences, 25(9), 4824. Available at: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC11084672/ (Accessed: 20 March 2026).

    Firth, J. et al. (2019) ‘The efficacy and safety of nutrient supplements in the treatment of mental disorders: a meta‐review of meta‐analyses of randomized controlled trials’, World Psychiatry, 18(3), pp. 308–324. Available at: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6732706/ (Accessed: 20 March 2026).

    Habib, M. et al. (2023) ‘Exploring the relationship between vitamin D deficiency and depression in patients with mood disorders’, Psychiatry Research, 328, 115472. Available at: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10625912/ (Accessed: 20 March 2026).

    Young, L.M. et al. (2019) ‘A systematic review and meta-analysis of B vitamin supplementation on depressive symptoms, anxiety, and stress: effects on healthy and ‘at-risk’ individuals’, Nutrients, 11(9), 2232. Available at: https://www.mdpi.com/2072-6643/11/9/2232 (Accessed: 20 March 2026).

  • Gravitational Waves (Instrumental Version)

    Gravitational Waves (Instrumental Version)

    I produced this song a long time ago, and forgot about it. Then, I played it back to myself recently and it made me feel something unique. I thought that maybe I could share this feeling with the world, and therefore I decided to publish it in stores.

    Advertisements
  • The Classical Psychoanalytic Theory of Hysteria

    The Classical Psychoanalytic Theory of Hysteria

    The classical psychoanalytic theory of hysteria, developed primarily by Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud in the late 19th century, represents one of the foundational pillars of modern psychology. It transformed the understanding of a condition once dismissed as “wandering womb” or demonic possession into a sophisticated model of unconscious conflict, repression, and somatic conversion. Although the term “hysteria” has largely been abandoned in contemporary diagnostic manuals (replaced by conversion disorder or somatic symptom disorder), the original theory remains influential in clinical practice, cultural studies, and the history of ideas. This essay outlines the historical context, core concepts, key mechanisms, landmark case studies, and lasting legacy of the classical psychoanalytic theory of hysteria.

    Advertisements

    Historical Context and the Birth of the Theory

    In the 1880s, Jean-Martin Charcot at the Salpêtrière Hospital in Paris popularised the idea that hysteria was a neurological disorder triggered by trauma or suggestion. His dramatic public demonstrations of hypnotic induction and symptom reproduction captivated the young Sigmund Freud, who visited in 1885. Freud returned to Vienna convinced that hysteria was not merely neurological but psychological. Collaborating with his mentor Josef Breuer, Freud published Studies on Hysteria in 1895, the foundational text of psychoanalytic theory (Freud and Breuer, 1895) . The book introduced the “talking cure” and laid the groundwork for the entire psychoanalytic enterprise.

    Core Concept: Conversion Hysteria

    The central innovation of the classical theory is the concept of conversion. Freud and Breuer argued that hysterical symptoms arise when a psychic conflict—usually sexual or traumatic in origin—is repressed from conscious awareness and “converted” into a physical symptom. The energy of the repressed affect is discharged somatically rather than psychologically, producing paralysis, blindness, convulsions, anaesthesia, or globus hystericus (a sensation of a lump in the throat). This conversion serves two purposes: it relieves the psychic tension (primary gain) and simultaneously expresses the forbidden wish or trauma in disguised form (secondary gain).

    Breuer and Freud famously summarised their insight with the phrase: “Hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences” (Freud and Breuer, 1895) . The symptom is not random; it is symbolically related to the repressed memory or conflict. For example, a patient who cannot speak may be symbolically “silenced” by a traumatic secret.

    The Mechanism of Repression and Catharsis

    Repression is the cornerstone mechanism. When an intolerable idea or affect threatens to enter consciousness, the ego represses it into the unconscious. The repressed material does not disappear; it remains charged with affect and seeks discharge through conversion or other compromise formations (dreams, slips, symptoms).

    The therapeutic counterpart is catharsis—the release of the strangulated affect through verbalisation and emotional abreaction. Breuer’s famous patient “Anna O.” (Bertha Pappenheim) coined the term “talking cure.” Under hypnosis she recounted traumatic memories with full emotional intensity, after which her symptoms disappeared. Freud initially adopted hypnosis but soon replaced it with free association, arguing that conscious recall without resistance was more lasting (Freud, 1909).

    Landmark Case Studies

    The theory was built on detailed clinical material. Breuer’s Anna O. case illustrated how symptoms could shift as memories were uncovered (e.g., contractures appearing on the side opposite the traumatic memory). Freud’s “Dora” case (Ida Bauer, 1905) demonstrated the role of sexual conflict, transference, and dream analysis in hysteria. Dora’s symptoms (aphonia, cough) were interpreted as expressions of repressed sexual fantasies and revenge against her father and Herr K. (Freud, 1905).

    These cases also revealed the limitations of the early model. Freud gradually recognised the importance of infantile sexuality and the Oedipus complex, moving away from a purely traumatic aetiology toward a developmental theory of neurosis.

    Evolution and Criticisms

    By the early 20th century, Freud had largely abandoned the seduction theory (the idea that hysteria stemmed from real childhood sexual abuse) in favour of fantasy and internal conflict. Later analysts such as Sandor Ferenczi and Melanie Klein further developed the theory, emphasising object relations and pre-Oedipal trauma. The classical model was criticised for over-emphasising sexuality (feminists such as Hélène Cixous and Luce Irigaray saw it as pathologising women’s bodies) and for its lack of empirical rigour. Modern neuroscientific research has partially rehabilitated conversion disorder, showing altered brain connectivity in sensorimotor and limbic regions consistent with Freud’s ideas of repressed affect (Vuilleumier, 2014).

    Contemporary Relevance

    Although the diagnostic label has changed, the classical theory’s insights endure. Conversion symptoms still appear in clinical practice, often in patients with unresolved trauma. The emphasis on unconscious conflict, symbolic meaning, and the therapeutic power of narrative remains central to psychodynamic psychotherapy. In forensic settings, understanding hysterical mechanisms can help distinguish genuine symptoms from malingering. Culturally, the theory illuminates phenomena such as mass psychogenic illness, moral panics, and the somatic expression of social distress in marginalised groups.

    Conclusion

    In conclusion, the classical psychoanalytic theory of hysteria transformed medicine and psychology by revealing the mind-body connection as meaningful rather than mysterious. From Breuer and Freud’s 1895 Studies on Hysteria to contemporary neuroimaging, the core idea endures: symptoms that appear purely physical may carry profound psychological meaning. Understanding this legacy equips clinicians, scholars, and patients alike to approach somatic distress with empathy, curiosity, and respect for the unconscious.

    References

    Freud, S. and Breuer, J. (1895) Studies on hysteria. Standard Edition, Vol. 2. London: Hogarth Press. Available at: https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/264434/the-divided-self-by-r-d-laing/ (Accessed: 18 March 2026).

    Freud, S. (1905) Fragment of an analysis of a case of hysteria (Dora). Standard Edition, Vol. 7. London: Hogarth Press. Available at: https://www.freud.org.uk/works/1905/fragments-of-an-analysis-of-a-case-of-hysteria-dora/ (Accessed: 18 March 2026).

    Freud, S. (1909) Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis. Standard Edition, Vol. 10. London: Hogarth Press.

    Vuilleumier, P. (2014) ‘Brain circuits implicated in psychogenic paralysis in conversion disorders and hypnosis’, Neurophysiologie Clinique, 44(4), pp. 323–337. Available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4141772/ (Accessed: 18 March 2026).

  • Ontological Insecurity: The Path of Existential Anxiety, Uncertainty, and Depth

    Ontological Insecurity: The Path of Existential Anxiety, Uncertainty, and Depth

    I’ve often grappled with questions of identity and stability. Who am I when the world feels unmoored? This personal reflection leads me to ontological insecurity—a profound concept from psychology and sociology that captures the fragility of our sense of self. In this piece, I’ll explore what ontological insecurity is, its origins, causes, manifestations, and implications, drawing on key theorists and contemporary examples. As someone profiling human experiences through a forensic lens, I find this topic not just academic but deeply human, offering insights into why we sometimes feel adrift in an ever-shifting world.

    Advertisements

    Ontological insecurity refers to a deep-seated anxiety arising from a disrupted sense of being, where individuals lose confidence in the stability of their self-identity, relationships, and the world around them. Coined by psychiatrist R.D. Laing in his seminal work The Divided Self (1960), it describes a mental state where the self feels vulnerable to dissolution, leading to disorientation and existential dread. Laing defined it as the inverse of ontological security—a “centrally firm sense of his own and other people’s reality and identity” (Laing, 1960) . In this secure state, one experiences life as coherent and predictable; in insecurity, everyday existence becomes fraught with threats of implosion, engulfment, or petrification—fears of being overwhelmed by reality, turned to stone (emotionally frozen), or invaded by external forces.

    Laing’s concept emerged from his psychoanalytic training and existential philosophy influences, particularly object relations theory and thinkers like Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre. He applied it to schizophrenia, arguing that psychotic individuals lack the basic existential foundation others take for granted, leading to fragmented self-perception (Laing, 1960) . This psychological framing views ontological insecurity as a core feature of severe mental distress, where the self is not “embodied” but constantly at risk. Modern research links it to self-disorders in schizophrenia spectrum conditions, including basic symptoms like distorted bodily experiences or hyper-reflexivity (Sass and Parnas, 2003).

    Sociologist Anthony Giddens expanded the term in the 1990s, applying it to late modernity’s impact on identity. In Modernity and Self-Identity (1991), Giddens describes ontological security as the trust in the continuity of one’s self-narrative and social environment, maintained through routines and institutions. Ontological insecurity arises when rapid social changes—globalisation, technological disruption, fluid relationships—erode this stability, leaving individuals feeling unanchored (Giddens, 1991). For Giddens, modernity’s “reflexive project of the self” demands constant self-reinvention, but without solid foundations, it breeds anxiety. This sociological lens highlights how broader structures contribute to personal disquiet, beyond individual pathology.

    Causes of ontological insecurity are multifaceted. In psychology, early childhood disruptions—unstable attachments, trauma, or neglect—can undermine the “basic trust” Erik Erikson described, leading to lifelong vulnerability (Erikson, 1950). Laing emphasised how “schizoid” personalities develop defensive detachment to avoid engulfment by others. Contemporary studies link it to adverse childhood experiences (ACEs), where chronic stress alters neurodevelopment, impairing self-coherence (Felitti et al., 1998).

    Sociologically, modern life’s liquidity—fluid careers, disposable relationships, digital fragmentation—fuels insecurity. Zygmunt Bauman’s “liquid modernity” (2000) echoes Giddens, arguing that transient institutions leave individuals adrift, constantly renegotiating identity (Bauman, 2000). The COVID-19 pandemic exemplified this: lockdowns, disrupted routines, amplifying isolation and existential doubt. Research post-2020 shows increased ontological insecurity manifesting as identity crises, with many reporting a “loss of self” amid uncertainty (Oakes, 2023).

    Manifestations vary. Psychologically, it may appear as chronic anxiety, depersonalisation (feeling detached from one’s body), or derealisation (world feels unreal). In extreme cases, it underpins psychotic experiences, where boundaries between self and other blur (Konecki, 2018). Sociologically, it drives behaviours like compulsive social media use for validation or avoidance of commitments, fearing engulfment. Examples abound: refugees experiencing cultural dislocation often report ontological insecurity, their sense of “home” shattered (Markham, 2021). In everyday life, job loss or divorce can trigger it, eroding the narrative continuity Giddens describes.

    Impacts are profound. Ontologically insecure individuals may struggle with relationships, fearing intimacy as a threat to autonomy. In society, it contributes to polarisation, as people cling to rigid ideologies for stability (Urban Studies Institute, 2024). Health-wise, it correlates with depression, anxiety disorders, and even physical symptoms like fatigue, mirroring my own battles with hormonal imbalances.

    Coping strategies draw from both fields. Therapeutically, mindfulness and schema therapy rebuild self-coherence (Young et al., 2016). Sociologically, fostering stable communities and routines counters modernity’s flux. As Laing suggested, acknowledging insecurity as part of the human condition can be liberating.

    In conclusion, ontological insecurity is the existential unease from a fractured sense of being, rooted in psychological vulnerability and modern societal pressures. From Laing’s clinical insights to Giddens’ sociological frame, it explains much of contemporary disquiet. Understanding it empowers us to rebuild security—one routine, one connection at a time. As I navigate my own path, I find solace in this knowledge; perhaps you will too.

    References

    Bauman, Z. (2000) Liquid modernity. Polity Press. Available at: https://www.politybooks.com/bookdetail/?isbn=9780745624099 (Accessed: 10 March 2026).

    Erikson, E. H. (1950) Childhood and society. Norton. Available at: https://wwnorton.com/books/9780393310344 (Accessed: 10 March 2026).

    Felitti, V. J. et al. (1998) ‘Relationship of childhood abuse and household dysfunction to many of the leading causes of death in adults’, American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 14(4), pp. 245–258. Available at: https://www.ajpmonline.org/article/S0749-3797(98)00017-8/fulltext (Accessed: 10 March 2026).

    Giddens, A. (1991) Modernity and self-identity: Self and society in the late modern age. Polity Press. Available at: https://www.politybooks.com/bookdetail/?isbn=9780745609324 (Accessed: 10 March 2026).

    Konecki, K. T. (2018) ‘The problem of ontological insecurity: What can we learn from sociology today? Some Zen Buddhist inspirations’, Qualitative Sociology Review, 14(2), pp. 50–68. Available at: http://www.qualitativesociologyreview.org/PL/Volume42/PSJ_14_2_Konecki.pdf (Accessed: 10 March 2026).

    Laing, R. D. (1960) The divided self: An existential study in sanity and madness. Penguin Books. Available at: https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/264434/the-divided-self-by-r-d-laing/ (Accessed: 10 March 2026).

    Markham, A. (2021) ‘Losing your sense of self: Ontological insecurity’, Annette Markham [blog], 6 November. Available at: https://annettemarkham.com/2021/11/losing-your-sense-of-self-ontological-insecurity (Accessed: 10 March 2026).

    Oakes, M. B. (2023) ‘Ontological insecurity in the post-covid-19 fallout: Using existentialism as a method to develop a psychosocial understanding to a mental health crisis’, Health Psychology and Behavioral Medicine, 11(1), pp. 1–15. Available at: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10425504/ (Accessed: 10 March 2026).

    Sass, L. A. and Parnas, J. (2003) ‘Schizophrenia, consciousness, and the self’, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 29(3), pp. 427–444. Available at: https://academic.oup.com/schizophrBull/article/29/3/427/1879716 (Accessed: 10 March 2026).

    Urban Studies Institute (2024) ‘Ontological insecurity in the modern world: Understanding its origins’, Urban Studies Institute, 21 July. Available at: https://urbanstudies.institute/urban-construct-development-dynamics/ontological-insecurity-modern-world-origins (Accessed: 10 March 2026).

    Young, F. (2016) A history of exorcism in Catholic Christianity. Palgrave Macmillan. Available at: https://link.springer.com/book/9783319291116 (Accessed: 10 March 2026).

  • I Stand Against The Modern Romanticisation of Pederasty, and Other Sexual Vicissitudes

    I Stand Against The Modern Romanticisation of Pederasty, and Other Sexual Vicissitudes

    As a forensic psychoanalyst , I often reserve my opinion on situations that are frequently misunderstood and which cause great offence to particular communities. However, personally, I cannot, I don’t want to, and I will not tolerate any form of romanticisation of those who harm children sexually – the pederasts. Nowadays, there is plenty of that. There are pederast prophets in some religions, pederast presidents in some countries, and pederast people who migrate.

    Advertisements

    I lay in bed staring at the ceiling. Too many thoughts rush through my mind. Too many memories of injustices which might never end. A repertoire of traumas that I can only wish I could shake off. But I cannot; the scar that sexual abuse left in my life cannot be erased. It cannot be healed. It cannot be forgotten. It haunts me every day…

    Subscribe to get access

    Read more of this content when you subscribe today.

    Subscribe